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Abstract
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency pro-
gram. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect
cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not
automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more
likely, the more so, the more firms report. Furthermore, the evidence is
distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence
can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm chooses to
remain silent. Minimum-evidence standards may counteract this ef-
fect. Under a marker system only one firm reports; this may increase
the cost of deterrence.
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1 Introduction
A corporate leniency program reduces the sanctions for self-reporting car-
tel members. In 1993 the US Department of Justice revised its Corporate
Leniency Program, committing itself to the lenient prosecution of the first
confessor. It allows amnesty to be awarded even when an investigation has
been started. This revision is considered as the most significant policy in-
novation in antitrust. It substantially increased the number of detected and
convicted cartels.1 The apparent success led the EU to adopt its own leniency
program in 1996. Other countries followed suit.
With this paper we add to the burgeoning theoretical literature on le-
niency. This literature, which we review at the end of this section, has
analyzed different effects of leniency. In this paper, we relax the following
two assumptions typically made in this literature: First, if one firm reports
the illegal behavior, the cartel is convicted for sure; each firm thus possesses
perfect evidence. Inducing one firm to report, no matter which one, is suffi-
cient for the antitrust authority (AA) to convict the cartel. Second, if each
firm has perfect evidence about the illegal behavior, the distribution of the
evidence is automatically symmetric.
By contrast, we look at the case where firms have imperfect and cumu-
lative evidence. If a firm reveals its evidence, it increases the probability
of conviction, but not necessarily to one. Put differently, in our framework
the evidence of two firms leads to a higher probability of conviction than
the evidence of only one firm.2 Under imperfect evidence it is more difficult
for the AA to deter collusion than under perfect evidence: the expected fine
increases by less if a firm reports.
With imperfect evidence we can also allow for asymmetric evidence, i.e.,
1See, e.g., Harrington and Chang (2009) or Spagnolo (2008).
2Talking about our own experience at the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO),
evidence from whistle-blowers makes the COMCO’s case stronger, but it is by no means
taken for granted that the COMCO’s ruling will be upheld on appeal.
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one firm may have more evidence of the illegal behavior than another firm.
We show that the asymmetry of the evidence may increase the AA’s cost
of deterrence. A high-evidence firm may be reluctant to apply for leniency
even when a low-evidence firm does so. Finally, our framework allows us
to analyze minimum-evidence standards as well as the effects of a marker
system where the AA informs a firm whether leniency is still available.3
To be more specific, in our set-up two firms may repeatedly collude. If
they do, they share the monopoly profit each period. Unilaterally deviating
from collusion is attractive for the deviator and detrimental for the colluding
firm. If the firms do not collude, they end up with competitive profits. The
stage game is thus of the prisoners’ dilemma type. Firms support collusion
in the repeated game with grim-trigger strategies.
The AA wishes to deter collusion at minimal cost. The legislator has
stipulated a fine for collusive behavior and a leniency program which grants
full leniency to the first reporting firm. The AA chooses the probability that
it starts an investigation as well as the effort it puts into the investigation.
The AA’s effort together with the evidence provided by the firms determines
the probability of conviction.
In Section 3, we look at the scenario without a minimum standard of ev-
idence and without a marker system. When a firm reports, it does not know
its position in line, i.e., whether it gets leniency or not. For each possible
level of the fine we characterize the AA’s cost-minimizing enforcement pol-
icy. It turns out that the asymmetry of the evidence may increase the AA’s
enforcement cost as compared to symmetric evidence. With a high fine the
AA needs little effort to deter collusion. With little effort by the AA, the
evidence provided by firms is crucial. The high-evidence firm faces the fol-
lowing trade-off: If it reports, on the one hand, it has a chance to be granted
leniency. On the other hand, it increases the probability of conviction sig-
3The only papers we are aware of analyzing imperfect and asymmetric evidence are
Feess and Walzl (2005) and Silbye (2010). As to the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to analyze a marker system formally.
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nificantly. With little effort by the AA it therefore prefers to remain silent
while the low-evidence firm reports.4 The AA has to provide more effort to
deter collusion as compared to the case where the evidence is symmetric and
both firms report.
Within this framework we study the effects of a minimum standard of
evidence in Section 4. If the standard is so low that both firms pass, it has
no bite and our analysis without such a standard applies. A standard so
high that no firm qualifies means effectively no leniency program and the
AA does worse than without the standard. A standard such that the high-
evidence firm qualifies while the low evidence firm does not lowers the AA’s
enforcement cost. Such a minimum standard provides the high-evidence firm
with strong incentives to report: it can be sure to avoid the fine, the low-
evidence firm cannot interfere.
In Section 5, we look at the case where the AA uses a marker system.
After a firm applies for the marker, the AA informs the firm about its position
in line. If the firm is first in line, it gets the marker and thus leniency if it
chooses to report. The marker system allows firms to play the conditional
strategy: report if the marker is available and do not report if the marker
is no longer available. Firms play this strategy over a range of parameters
where without the marker they would both report. When both firms play this
conditional strategy, each of them is with equal probability first in line. This,
in turn, means that the AA gets only one report, with equal probability the
high or the low evidence. Thus, it gets less evidence than in the no-marker
case where both firms report. More effort is necessary to deter this kind of
collusion in the marker case than in the no-marker case.
Nevertheless, if firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the marker can be help-
ful for the AA. Without the marker, only the low-evidence firm reports while
the high-evidence firm remains silent. With the marker, both firms play the
4This outcome, whereby a firm turns its fellow colluder in, runs contrary to the predic-
tion of all previous models that either both or no firms apply; an exception is Harrington
(2013).
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conditional strategy and the AA gets the high or the low evidence with equal
probability. Since it gets more evidence, it needs fewer resources to deter
collusion than in the no-marker case. With minimum-evidence standards,
the marker system is ineffective. If only the high-evidence firm qualifies for
leniency, it can be sure to avoid the fine and a marker is not necessary for
that privilege.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper builds on the analysis of leniency programs by Motta and Polo
(2003), Spagnolo (2003), Aubert et al. (2006), and Harrington (2008).5 This
literature analyzes the effects of leniency on the frequency of collusion. The
main focus is to derive optimal fine structures; imperfect evidence is dealt
with only in passing. In Aubert et al. (2006), for example, firms are able to
partially destroy their evidence, thereby reducing the cartel’s risk of being
convicted. In Harrington (2008), the AA’s stand-alone evidence varies over
time, which affects the value of additional evidence provided by the firms.
By contrast to our analysis, in all of the above-mentioned papers a cartel is
convicted for sure as soon as one member submits evidence.
The issue of asymmetric and imperfect evidence was first addressed in
Feess and Walzl (2005). Like in our framework, the firms possess different
amounts of evidence about the illegal behavior. The AA optimally chooses a
fine structure where the fine decreases with the amount of evidence provided.
Silbye (2010) takes up this idea and extends the static Feess and Walzl set-up
to repeated interactions. We touch on the issue of the optimal fine structure
in Section 4. Nevertheless, following the institutional characteristics of the
US leniency program, in our setting firms either get full or no leniency at all.
The focus of our analysis is the cumulative nature of evidence. Both
5Further recent theoretical research includes Harrington and Chang (2009), Harrington
(2013), and Sauvagnat (2014); empirical and experimental research includes Bigoni et al.
(2010), Brenner (2009), and Miller (2009). For surveys of the earlier literature, see Rey
(2003) and Spagnolo (2008).
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Feess and Walzl (2005) and Silbye (2010) assume that only one firm applies
for leniency. The AA cannot get hold of the non-reporting firm’s evidence.
Thus, they implicitly assume that a firm observes if the other firm reports.
We deal with this informational issue explicitly. Under a leniency program
with a marker system a firm finds out whether its conspirator applied for
leniency. In the absence of a marker system, a firm does not know whether
the other firm applied for leniency. It is possible that the AA benefits from
having more than one leniency application because more evidence strengthens
its case.6
1.2 Institutional Background
In both the US and in the EU, the institutional details of a leniency program
are not determined by competition law, but rather by internal documents of
the AAs.7 This implies that the AA can revise its leniency program as to
what it sees fit. Therefore, in our analysis, we only specify a limited number
of details and allow the AA to choose between several institutional designs.
Typical features of leniency programs include: first, the assignment of
leniency to the first applicant who reports participation in a cartel; second,
a marker system that allows an applicant to secure its position in line; third,
the requirement of full disclosure of evidence; fourth, an ongoing requirement
to fully cooperate with the AA; fifth, a requirement to give up collusive
behavior. We take these features into account. In line with the US leniency
program, in our model only the first evidence-providing firm receives leniency.
We require the firms to reveal all evidence in their possession. Furthermore,
a reporting firm has to give up its collusive conduct.
Both the US and the EU leniency programs specify requirements concern-
ing the evidence an applicant has to provide. The Antitrust Division of the
6Moreover, we embed the ideas of Feess and Walzl (2005) and Silbye (2010) in a more
general framework in the spirit of Motta and Polo (2003). In particular, we endogenize
the AA’s detection and conviction probabilities.
7See Department of Justice (2008) and European Commission (2006).
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US Department of Justice requires to report “the wrongdoing with candor
and completeness” and to provide “cooperation that advances the Division in
its investigation.”8 In Section 4, we model these requirements by introducing
minimum standards of evidence.
We also use our framework to analyze the effects of a marker system, a
standard element of most leniency programs. Common arguments for its use
are legal certainty and transparency, and that it encourages a “race to the
courthouse.” In possession of the marker, a firm has, e.g., 30 days to collect
the evidence necessary to “perfect the marker.” Within this time, it cannot
be leapfrogged by other firms.9 For reasons of tractability, we ignore the time
dimension of the marker system. In our model, the AA immediately informs
a firm whether leniency is available.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the model. In Section 3 we derive the equilibria. In Section 4 we analyze
minimum standards of evidence and in Section 5 the marker system. Section
6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a setting where each industry consists of two potentially col-
luding firms, a and b. At the outset, the legislator and the AA announce
their policy. The AA’s choice consists of two elements. First, the AA starts
an investigation with probability α ∈ [0, 1]; second, the AA decides how
much effort p ∈ [0, 1] it puts into the investigation.10 This effort gives rise
to the probability P of detecting and convicting a cartel; we will specify P
as we move along. Moreover, the legislator announces the fine F > 0 that
8See Department of Justice (2008). Likewise, the European Commission requires that
the evidence has to enable the Commission to find an infringement of Article 101 TFEU
(European Commission, 2006).
9See, e.g., Sandhu (2007).
10Actually, the AA determines α and p by the choice of the size and the allocation of
its manpower; see Section 2.1. We extend the AA’s strategy set in Sections 4 and 5.
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a convicted firm pays whenever it communicated with the other firm in the
period under consideration. The legislator grants leniency to the first report-
ing firm.11 To get leniency, the reporting firm has to provide evidence of the
conspiracy and it has to immediately stop the collusive conduct. Without a
marker system, the AA does not inform firms about their position in line. If
both firms choose to report, nature determines with equal probability who
is first. Accordingly, in expectation each firm obtains half the leniency. We
look at the case of full leniency so that the reporting firm ends up with no
fine while the non-reporting firm pays F ; if both firms report, each of them
pays in expectation F/2.
Then an infinitely repeated game starts. The stage game in each period
t = 0, . . . has the following structure: First firm i, i = a, b, decides whether
it wants to communicate with the other firm or not. If both firms choose to
communicate, they create evidence that —if detected— leads to a conviction
by the AA; unless both firms communicate, they do not engage in illegal
behavior and there is thus no evidence thereof. The evidence dissolves at the
end of the period.12
Then the AA starts an investigation with probability α; with probability
(1− α) there is no investigation. Next the firms choose “classical” economic
conduct variables such as quantities under Cournot competition, prices under
Bertrand competition, or where to sell under exclusive territories. Simulta-
neously, the firms decide whether they report any communication (R) or not
(N); firms can report both when there is an investigation and when there
is no investigation.13 The firms’ reporting behavior together with the AA’s
11As we will show in the section on minimum standards for evidence, the AA indeed
deters cartels at a lower cost with than without a leniency program. Our set-up corre-
sponds to the US system which does not allow for leniency for a second-reporting firm.
By contrast, the EU program offers reduced leniency also to all other firms that are not
first to come forward, provided that the additional information is sufficiently valuable.
Spagnolo (2008), however, argues that the two systems are more similar than they appear.
12Note that communication, even when it is not followed by anti-competitive behavior,
is considered illegal.
13We assume that the firms report whenever they are indifferent. We rule out strategic
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investigation effort determines the probability of conviction,
P =

p, if no firm reports;
pi, if firm i reports, i = a, b;
p2, if both firms report.
Let us describe the specific form of P using an example. Suppose the firms’
communication has created m pieces of evidence each of which adds η ≤ 1/m
to P . Let mAA ≤ m denote the evidence uncovered by the AA; mAA ≥ 0
if the AA has started an investigation and mAA = 0 if it did not. mi ≤ m
denotes the evidence in possession of firm i, i = a, b. Then p = ηmAA is the
probability of conviction of the AA’s stand-alone evidence; p is chosen by the
AA’s effort at the outset. Let ρi = ηmi denote the probability of conviction
generated by the stand-alone evidence of firm i, i = a, b. Let the pieces of
evidence be independently distributed. Then we have for the joint evidence
(AA and one firm, or AA and both firms)
pi := 1− (1− p)(1− ρi), i = a, b;
p2 := 1− (1− p)(1− ρa)(1− ρb).
If, say, only firm b reports, pb = p+ ρb − pρb; in terms of evidence, expected
total evidence is given by the evidence uncovered by the AA plus the evi-
dence provided by firm b minus the expected value of the evidence in joint
possession.
Note that we have p ≤ pi ≤ p2, i = a, b, and subadditivity p2 ≤ pa + pb.
Furthermore, the probability of conviction is equal to one if and only if
either the AA has perfect evidence (p = 1) or at least one of the firms
submits perfect evidence (ρi = 1, i = a, b). Put differently, if p < 1 and
both firms submit imperfect evidence, the probability of conviction is less
than one. Leniency is an instrument for the AA to gather the evidence to
destruction of evidence; see also Footnote 26. If a firm withholds evidence, this will be
detected in the course of the investigation and it loses leniency. Accordingly, a firm either
submits all its available evidence or it does not report at all.
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eventually prove an infringement of the competition law.14 In our setting,
the AA requires that the reporting firm submits all available evidence; this
means that firm i reveals mi pieces of evidence. Nevertheless, it does not
require that the reporting firm pleads guilty. The AA still has to prove an
infringement.15 Moreover, the reporting firms do not have to waive their
right to appeal the AA’s decision.16 Therefore, we consider the case of a
certain conviction when all members of a cartel report an exception rather
than the rule.
Without loss of generality we assume ρa ≤ ρb, which implies pa ≤ pb.
There are various reasons why firms may possess different amounts of evi-
dence. The employees of one firm may be particularly diligent in documenting
their communication related to the cartel. A firm complying with, e.g., ISO
certification standards has to file the minutes of all meetings while a non-
certified firm has no such obligation. Furthermore, a cartel member might
have little evidence because an employee involved in the cartel has left the
firm in the meantime and all her documents containing information about
the cartel have disappeared. Thus, in practice, the overlap of the evidence
provided by the firms is typically not perfect.
Next let us describe how firms collude. By communicating firms try to
establish collusion with respect to economic conduct.17 They agree to choose
14By contrast, settlement is a tool to speed up the procedure to reach a cartel decision.
Both the US Department of Justice and the European Commission require that the parties
plead guilty to settle a cartel case.
15The US Department of Justice requires that leniency applicants “confess participation
in a criminal antitrust violation” (Department of Justice (2008)). However, the Depart-
ment of Justice has to carry out the investigation and prove an infringement.
16For example, in the air cargo cartel Lufthansa received full immunity from
fines under the European Commission’s leniency program because it was the
first to provide information about the cartel (europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-10-
1487 en.htm?locale=en). Nevertheless, Lufthansa filed an appeal “based on legal consid-
erations” (bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-27/japan-airlines-appeals-48-8-million-antitrust-
fine-at-eu-court.html).
17In line with Aubert et al. (2006), we assume that tacit collusion is impossible, that
is, communication is a prerequisite for collusion.
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qM , which is half the monopoly quantity in a Cournot example.
18 This leads
to a stage profit of πM for each firm. Firms support the collusive behavior
with grim-trigger strategies. If a firm deviates from qM , Nash punishment
qC starts and continues forever; denote the static Nash profit of each firm
by πC . If a firm deviates while the other firm colludes, the deviating firm
chooses qD and its profit is πD; in this case the colluding firm’s profit is π.
Let π ≤ πC < πM < πD. We assume that the cartel is stable in the absence
of the AA, meaning that πM/(1 − δ) ≥ πD + δπC/(1 − δ), where δ denotes
the firms’ common discount rate: getting πM forever is better than getting
πD in the first round and from then on πC .
19 Recall that to get leniency,
a reporting firm has to give up its collusive conduct. Therefore, reporting
automatically triggers punishment because the reporting firm has to give up
setting qM .
2.1 Enforcement Technology
Legislation stipulates the fine F as well as full leniency. The AA strives to
deter all cartels at minimum cost.20 It chooses the size of its staff L; normal-
izing the wage to 1, L also measures the AA’s cost. Given N industries, the
AA determines the n ≤ N ones to be investigated, i.e., α = n/N . The AA
then allocates L/n people to each industry. The stand-alone probability of
conviction p increases linearly with the manpower allocated to that industry,
18The interpretation of qM (also of qD and qC , defined below) depends on the type of
the cartel. In a Bertrand set-up, for example, qM refers to the monopoly price.
19In a Cournot set-up with linear demand 1− q1− q2 and zero marginal cost, qM = 1/4,
qC = 1/3, and qD = 3/8 such that π = 7/72, πC = 1/9, πM = 1/8, and πD = 9/64.
The cartel is stable if δ ≥ 9/17. In a Bertrand framework firms collude by charging
the monopoly price. Deviating means undercutting the monopoly price and competition
entails prices equal marginal cost. With exclusive territories firms collude by not selling
in their rival’s territory. A deviating firm unilaterally sells in the rival’s market. If firms
compete, they both serve the entire market. See, e.g., Aubert et al (2006).
20See Motta and Polo (2003) for a similar approach.
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i.e.,
p(L, n) =
{
γL/n, if L/n ≤ 1/γ;
1, otherwise,
with γ > 0. If the AA uses manpower efficiently, i.e., L/n ≤ 1/γ, αp =
γL/N . Therefore, the AA’s cost is L = αpN/γ =: C(αp). With this enforce-
ment technology it is, for example, possible to monitor all industries (α = 1)
with very low p. This policy implies that the no-investigation subgame is
never reached.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We will first derive the firms’ behavior in the investigation and the no-
investigation subgames. Then we analyze under which conditions firms col-
lude and how the AA can deter communication. Finally, we determine the
cost-minimizing deterrence policy as a function of the fine F .
3.1 The Firms’ Behavior
Investigation Subgame Let us now analyze the subgame beginning after
the firms have communicated and the AA has started its investigation. In our
Cournot example, firms choose their quantities. Simultaneously, they decide
whether to report or not. As we will see below, their reporting strategies
determine their quantity choices. Therefore, we identify the firms’ strategies
only by their reporting behavior and look at the following equilibrium candi-
dates: Both firms report, (R,R), both firms do not report, (N,N), and one
firm reports while the other does not, (R,N) and (N,R). We will next deter-
mine under which conditions each candidate can indeed be an equilibrium;
if several possible equilibria exist, we pick the Pareto-superior one.
If both firms report, i.e., (R,R), the probability of conviction is p2. The
fact that both firms report triggers competition in all future periods. There-
fore, their quantity choices are determined solely by the stage game, the only
12
equilibrium of which is the competitive one with both firms setting qC . Ac-
cordingly, (R,R) yields πC/(1−δ)−p2F/2 for each firm. For (R,R) to be an
equilibrium, firm b, say, must have no incentive to deviate. If b deviates while
a reports, the firms still compete from the next period on; thus b sets qC in
the current period. Therefore, if firm b deviates to N , it chooses qC yielding
the competitive profit πC . Its payoff from deviating is thus πC/(1−δ)−paF .
Firm b pays the fine for sure rather than with probability 1/2; in return it
lowers the probability of conviction from p2 to pa because the AA has less
evidence. Accordingly, a necessary condition for (R,R) to be a Nash equi-
librium in the subgame is p2 ≤ 2pi, i = a, b. Since pa ≤ pb, (R,R) is an
equilibrium if
p2 ≤ 2pa or p ≥ 1− 1/((1− ρa)(1 + ρb)) =: p̂. (1)
Note that p̂ ≤ 1/2.
If no firm reports, i.e., (N,N), the probability of conviction is p. Both
firms collude with respect to qM because this Pareto dominates (N,N) to-
gether with qC . Moreover, if it is optimal to collude in the current period,
it is also optimal to not report and collude in future periods. Thus, a firm’s
payoff is πM − pF +
∑∞
t=1 δ
t(πM −αpF ).21 If a firm deviates to R and qD, it
earns πD and pays no penalty in the current period. From the next period
on the firms compete which implies that there is no risk to pay the fine. The
firm’s deviation profit is thus πD + δπC/(1 − δ). A necessary condition for
(N,N) to be a Nash equilibrium in the subgame is
p ≤ (πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD)/(1− δ + δα)F =: pN,N(α). (2)
If a reports while b does not, i.e., (R,N), the probability of conviction is
pa. Firm a’s reporting triggers competition in all future periods. Thus, the
stage game determines the equilibrium and both firms choose qC . Since a
21This assumes that firms also play (N,N) in the no-investigation subgame. In the next
section we show that this is indeed the case.
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reports while b does not, a is granted full leniency yielding a payoff πC/(1−
δ). Suppose firm a unilaterally deviates to N . Then competition is still
triggered from the next period onwards because firm b plays qC in the current
period. Firm a would thus play N together with qC . However, this cannot
be optimal because a loses the leniency. Firm b obtains πC/(1 − δ) − paF
in (R,N). If b also reports, its payoff is πC/(1− δ)− p2F/2. Accordingly, a
necessary and sufficient condition for (R,N) to be played in the subgame is
that the expected fine for b when reporting exceeds the expected fine when
not reporting, or
p2 > 2pa. (3)
Analogously, as a condition for (N,R) to be played in the subgame we obtain
p2 > 2pb. The assumption ρa ≤ ρb implies that this condition is never
satisfied, so that (N,R) is never played. If (1) is satisfied, (3) does not hold.
The two equilibrium candidates (R,R) and (R,N) thus exclude each other.
Moreover, one of the candidates always exists.
If (2) is satisfied, the equilibrium (N,N) also exists, so that the issue
of equilibrium selection arises. Recall that for (N,N) to be an equilibrium,
the equilibrium payoff must be greater or equal than the deviation payoff
πD + δπC/(1 − δ) which in turn is greater than πC/(1 − δ). In (R,R) both
firms get πC/(1− δ)− p2F/2 < πC/(1− δ). In (R,N) firm a gets πC/(1− δ)
and firm b gets πC/(1 − δ) − paF . Both payoffs are less than the payoffs
in (N,N) which, therefore, Pareto-dominates all other possible equilibria.
Thus, if (2) is satisfied with strict inequality, the firms indeed play (N,N).
No-Investigation Subgame As in the investigation subgame, we can
identify the firms’ strategies only by their reporting behavior. We will derive
the necessary conditions such that firms do not report in the no-investigation
case. If they choose to report in this subgame, they will certainly not com-
municate in the first place so that there is no need for the AA to deter cartel
formation.
14
Our analysis here follows the different cases of the investigation subgame.
Let us start with the case where (R,R) is the equilibrium in the investigation
subgame, that is, (1) holds and (2) is violated. Suppose firms play (N,N)
together with qM when there is no investigation. Then the ex-ante expected
profit from communicating is
π((N,N), (R,R)) =
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− α)t
(
α
[
πC
1− δ
− p2
F
2
]
+ (1− α)πM
)
.
Firms start with communication and continue to do so if there was no in-
vestigation in the preceding period; if there is an investigation, they stop to
communicate and play qC . Now consider the no-investigation subgame. If a
firm does not report, it makes profit πM + δπ((N,N); (R,R)). If it reports
and chooses qD, its profit is πD + δπC/(1 − δ). Accordingly, the firms play
(N,N) in the no-investigation subgame if
πD + δπC/(1− δ) < πM + δπ((N,N), (R,R)) or
π((N,N), (R,R)) > πC/(1− δ) + (πD − πM)/δ. (4)
If (4) is not satisfied, at least one firm reports and picks qC .
Next consider the case where (R,N) is the equilibrium in the investiga-
tion case, i.e., (1) and (2) do not hold. Again, we want to determine under
which condition both firms do not report in the no-investigation case. Recall
that firm b which does not report in the investigation case does worse than
the reporting firm which gets leniency. Therefore, if the high-evidence firm
b plays N in the no-investigation subgame, the low-evidence firm a will cer-
tainly do so, too. Suppose firms play (N,N) together with qM when there
is no investigation. Then the ex-ante expected profit from communicating of
firm b is
πb((N,N), (R,N)) =
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− α)t
(
α
[
πC
1− δ
− paF
]
+ (1− α)πM
)
.
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By the same reasoning as above, the firms play (N,N) in the no-investigation
subgame if
π((N,N), (R,N)) > πC/(1− δ) + (πD − πM)/δ. (5)
Finally, consider the case in which (N,N) is the equilibrium of the investi-
gation subgame, i.e., (2) is satisfied. Suppose firms play (N,N) together with
qM when there is no investigation. Then the ex-ante expected profit from
communicating is π((N,N), (N,N)) =
∑∞
t=0 δ
t (α [πM − pF ] + (1− α)πM).
The preceding argument yields that the firms do not report in the no-
investigation subgame if
π((N,N), (N,N)) > πC/(1− δ) + (πD − πM)/δ.
This condition is satisfied if (2) holds.
Communication Stage and Deterrence If a firm does not communi-
cate, it obtains πC in the current period. Stationarity implies that the firm
does not communicate in all future periods as well. The present value from
not communicating is πC/(1− δ).
Firms communicate and then play ((N,N), (R,R)) if π((N,N), (R,R)) >
πC/(1 − δ). The AA rules out this communication equilibrium if it makes
sure that the inequality does not hold. Straightforward computations show
that this is possible for sufficiently high values of α and p. In our set-up,
α and p are, however, costly. Obviously it is cheaper to make sure that
(4) is not satisfied: then firms report in the no-investigation subgame and
this communication equilibrium does not exist. In the appendix we derive
the function pR,R(α) such that if p ≥ pR,R(α), (4) is not satisfied and this
communication equilibrium does not exist.22
22A proper notation would be p(N,N),(R,R)(α) where (N,N) denotes the firms’ strategies
in the no-investigation and (R,R) in the investigation subgame. Since for all relevant
deterrence constraints firms play (N,N) in the no-investigation subgame, we suppress
(N,N) and write as a shortcut pR,R(α).
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Firms communicate and play ((N,N), (R,N)) if π((N,N), (R,N)) >
πC/(1 − δ). A similar argument as in the previous paragraph shows that
the AA deters efficiently by making sure that (5) does not hold. It does so
by setting p ≥ pR,N(α), which we also derive in the appendix.
Firms communicate and play ((N,N), (N,N)) if π((N,N), (N,N)) >
πC/(1 − δ) which holds if p < (πM − πC)/αF . This condition is satisfied
if (2) holds strictly. Thus, if p ≥ pN,N(α), the firms report in the investiga-
tion subgame and this communication equilibrium does not exist.
To sum up: The AA achieves complete deterrence if
p ≥ max{pN,N(α), pR,R(α), pR,N(α)}. (6)
3.2 Optimal Deterrence
The optimal policy of the AA minimizes C(αp) subject to (6). Proposition
1, which we prove in the appendix, characterizes the solution (α∗, p∗).
Proposition 1. There exist 0 < F < F such that:
a) if F < F , α∗ = (πM − δπC − (1− δ)(πD + F ))/δF and p∗ = 1;
b) if F ≥ F , α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and p∗ ∈ (0, 1):
i) for p̂ ≤ 0, α∗ is defined by pN,N(α∗) = pR,R(α∗);
ii) for p̂ > 0 and F ∈ (F , F ], α∗ is defined by pN,N(α∗) = pR,R(α∗);
iii) for p̂ > 0 and F > F , pN,N(α
∗) = pR,N(α
∗) defines α∗.
To explain this result, first note that the AA must always ensure that the
communication equilibrium ((N,N), (N,N)) is not played by firms. To see
this, suppose on the contrary that p ≥ pN,N(α) is not binding. If the AA
only has to deter the ((N,N), (R,R)) and ((N,N), (R,N)) communication
equilibria, it can do so by setting, e.g., α = 1 and p arbitrarily small, resulting
in arbitrarily small enforcement cost. With this policy the no-investigation
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subgame is never reached. In the investigation subgame firms make the
competitive profit πC minus the expected fine. Hence, they do better by not
communicating in the first place. Yet, with p small firms prefer not to report
in the investigation subgame, i.e., they play ((N,N), (N,N)).
Part a) of Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. With small F the leg-
islator endows the AA with limited punishment possibilities. Since fines are
low, not reporting in the investigation subgame dominates reporting. There-
fore, the AA only has to deter the ((N,N), (N,N)) communication equilib-
rium. To do so, high values of α and p are necessary, i.e., pN,N(α) is large. It
is cheaper to deter (N,N) in the investigation than in the no-investigation
subgame. In the investigation subgame p has a stronger deterrence effect
than α. Therefore, the AA optimally sets p∗ = 1 and α∗ < 1.
0
α
p
1
1
p̂
pN,N(α)
pR,R(α)
pR,N(α)
(α∗, p∗)
Figure 1: The deterrence region in case a)
Increasing F allows the AA to reduce α∗, which leads us to part b) of
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Proposition 1. With α small, the no-investigation subgame becomes suffi-
ciently likely, which, in turn, induces firms to collude. The communication
equilibria ((N,N), (R,R)) and ((N,N), (R,N)) are therefore attractive for
firms: they do not report and make profits πM in the no-investigation sub-
game. Firm b determines which of the two equilibria is played in the inves-
tigation subgame. If firm b reports, it increases the probability of conviction
by (p2− pa) while it reduces its expected fine by half. Thus, if p2 ≤ 2pa, firm
b reports. Recall that p2 ≤ 2pa is equivalent to p ≥ p̂ with p̂ given by (2);
accordingly, if p < p̂, firm b prefers not to report and vice versa for p ≥ p̂.
Since p̂ ≤ 1/2, for large values of p, firm b reports and p ≥ pR,R(α) defines
the second binding constraint; see Figure 2. To deter ((N,N), (R,R)), the
AA has to increase α; the higher fine F enables the AA to decrease p.
0
α
p
1
1
p̂
pN,N(α)
pR,R(α)
pR,N(α)
(α∗, p∗)
Figure 2: The deterrence region in case b) ii)
Further increasing F allows the AA to lower p until eventually p < p̂
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(provided p̂ > 0); see Figure 3. The lower p, the higher the increase in the
probability of conviction if b reports. Consequently, for low p firm b will not
report in the investigation subgame and p ≥ pR,N(α) is the second binding
constraint. If, however, p̂ ≤ 0, p ≥ pR,R(α) continues to define the second
binding constraint.
0
α
p
1
1
p̂
pN,N(α)
pR,R(α)
pR,N(α)
(α∗, p∗)
Figure 3: The deterrence region in case b) iii)
The value of p̂ thus plays a crucial role as to which constraint is binding.
p̂ is positive if ρb/(1 + ρb) > ρa which holds for ρb sufficiently larger than
ρa. If the two stand-alone probabilities of conviction are of similar size, firm
b will report in the investigation subgame like firm a. Call this the case of
symmetric firms. Let us now make firms asymmetric by increasing ρb while
holding ρa constant. This exercise increases b’s expected fine when reporting
while b’s fine when not reporting is unaffected. Thus, for ρb large enough firm
b prefers not to report and p ≥ pR,N(α) defines the second binding constraint
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for the AA. pR,N(α) > pR,R(α) for p < p̂, meaning that the AA incurs higher
cost of deterring cartels with asymmetric firms than cartels with symmetric
firms. This case distinguishes our analysis from previous work.23 These
papers look at the case where firms are symmetric and, moreover, reporting
of one firm increases the probability of conviction to 1.
To push this point somewhat further: The enforcement cost C(α∗p∗) de-
creases monotonically in F . If the legislator wants to minimize enforcement
costs in the spirit of Becker (1968), it chooses a high F . If firms are asym-
metric, we are in the case of Figure 3. The AA has to deter the firm with
the greater evidence from not reporting in the investigation subgame.
4 Minimum Standards of Evidence
Let us now analyze a minimum standard of evidence ρ̂: a firm is granted
leniency if and only if the evidence provided is at least ρ̂. If ρ̂ < ρa, the
minimum standard has no bite and our preceding analysis applies; ρ̂ > ρb
corresponds to having no leniency at all. As has been shown in the literature,
deterrence is more expensive without than with a leniency program: Inducing
a firm to report is more difficult because by doing so the firm does not avoid
the fine.24
This leaves us with the case ρa < ρ̂ ≤ ρb. Firm a can never avoid the
fine so that firm b is the only one to obtain leniency. Accordingly, the com-
munication equilibria ((N,N), (R,R)) and ((N,N), (R,N)) no longer exist.
To deter the ((N,N), (N,N)) communication equilibrium, the AA efficiently
induces firm b to report in the investigation subgame because it qualifies for
leniency. Firm b’s payoffs from not reporting and deviating are as described
above. Therefore, the AA deters this communication equilibrium by setting
23See, e.g., Motta and Polo (2002), Aubert et al (2006), and Harrington (2008).
24See, e.g., Motta and Polo (2002), Aubert et al (2006), and Harrington (2008). For-
mally, the pN,N (α)-curve which always binds in the optimum shifts upwards without le-
niency. The lowest cost of deterrence along this curve exceeds the highest cost of deterrence
along the pN,N (α)-curve when leniency is available.
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p ≥ pN,N(α), with pN,N(α) defined by (2).
Next consider ((N,N), (N,R)). In the no-investigation subgame, both
firms have the same deviation profit, πD + δπC/(1 − δ). Firm a, how-
ever, has the smaller continuation profit since it does not qualify for le-
niency. Therefore, the AA optimally induces firm a to deviate. In the no-
investigation subgame, firm a’s payoff from colluding is πM +
∑∞
t=1 δ
t(1 −
α)t−1 [α (πC/(1− δ)− pb(p)F ) + (1− α)πM ]. Firm a deviates if
p ≥ πM − πD + δ(1− α)(πD − πC)− ρbδαF
(1− ρb)δαF
=: pN,R(α).
Note that pN,R(α) equals pR,N(α), with ρb substituted by ρa. Accordingly,
pN,R(α) qualitatively has the same properties as pR,N(α).
Like in Proposition 1, for F ≥ F the AA’s optimal choice (α∗, p∗) satis-
fies pN,N(α
∗) = pN,R(α
∗), i.e., both restrictions hold with equality. Straight-
forward computations show that p ≥ pN,R(α) is less stringent than both
p ≥ pR,R(α) and p ≥ pR,N(α). Consequently, C(α∗p∗) is lower with the min-
imum standard than without. Given that firm a never applies for leniency,
firm b enjoys immunity whenever it reports. If firm b reports, the AA gets
ample of evidence. This, in turn, implies that firm a ex ante faces a high
expected fine. By contrast, without minimum standards either both firms
pay F/2 when convicted along ((N,N), (R,R))), or the conviction rate is
pa < pb because only the low-evidence firm a reports along ((N,N), (R,N)).
To sum up: A minimum standard may reduce the AA’s enforcement cost
if firms are asymmetric and the standard is such that firm b qualifies for
leniency while firm a does not. Such a minimum standard provides the high-
evidence firm with strong incentives to report: it can be sure to avoid the fine
if it chooses to report; the low-evidence firm cannot interfere. Nevertheless,
a minimum standard requires that the evidence is quantifiable and verifiable.
Moreover, the AA needs to know how much evidence the firms have to get
the standard right.25 If the AA faces, e.g., uncertainty as to the evidence
25In our model ρa and ρb are common knowledge.
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possessed by firms, it runs the risk of setting the standard too high so that
it actually does worse than with no minimum standard at all.26
5 Marker System
5.1 Conditional Reporting
Under a marker system the AA informs a firm upon request about its position
in line concerning leniency. If the firm is the first one in line, it gets the
marker and leniency if it chooses to report. By contrast, if the firm is second
in line and the first firm reports, the AA informs the second firm that the
marker and thus leniency are no longer available. Should both firms request
information about the availability of the marker at the same time, nature
determines with equal probability who is first.
The marker system creates additional strategies for firms compared to
the no-marker case. They can request the information and then condition
their reporting behavior on whether they get the marker (m) or not (n). For
example, a firm can play the strategy: report if the marker is available and
do not report if the marker is not available, i.e., (R|m,N |n). This strategy
weakly dominates unconditional reporting R. If, say, firm a is the first one to
report, both strategies yield the same payoff. If, however, firm a is second in
line, R yields a payoff strictly lower than (R|m,N |n). Since the firm does not
get the marker, it has to pay the fine F if convicted under both strategies.
If it does not report, the probability of conviction is lower than if it reports.
Likewise, the strategy (N |m,R|n) is weakly dominated by unconditional not
reporting N . If firm a is first in line, both strategies yield the same payoff.
If, however, firm a is second in line, (N |m,R|n) yields a payoff strictly lower
26Note that with minimum standards firms have an incentive to keep evidence in order
to qualify for leniency (see also Aubert et al. (2006) and Agislaou (2012)). Therefore, our
assumption that evidence cannot be destroyed is less restrictive with minimum standards
than without. This may be seen as a further argument in favor of minimum standards of
evidence.
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than N . The firm has to pay the fine F if convicted under both strategies.
If it does not report, the probability of conviction is lower than if it reports.
Assuming that firms do not play weakly dominated strategies, we are
left with the two strategies (R|m,N |n) and N for both the investigation
and the no-investigation subgame. As a shortcut we will denote the con-
ditional strategy (R|m,N |n) by RN . The two communication equilibria
((N,N), (N,N)) and ((N,N), (RN,RN)) are thus of interest. The analysis
of the ((N,N), (N,N)) equilibrium is along the same lines as in the no-marker
case. The deviation to consider is RN rather than R. When first in line, the
deviation to RN generates the same payoffs as the deviation to R. Thus, the
AA deters this equilibrium if p ≥ pN,N(α), where pN,N(α) is defined in (2).
Let us now turn to the ((N,N), (RN,RN)) communication equilibrium.
5.2 The Firms’ Behavior
Investigation Subgame If both firms play RN , the probability of con-
viction is with equal probability pa or pb, depending on who is first in line.
Firm b, for example, gets a payoff πC/(1 − δ) − paF/2; if b deviates to N ,
its payoff amounts to πC/(1− δ)− paF . Consequently, (RN,RN) is always
an equilibrium in the investigation subgame. If (N,N) is an equilibrium in
the investigation subgame, it Pareto dominates (RN,RN) and firms play
(N,N). This is the case if p < pN,N(α).
No-Investigation Subgame Suppose firms play (N,N) together with qM
when there is no investigation. Then firm a’s ex-ante expected profit from
communicating is
πa((N,N), (RN,RN)) =
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− α)t
(
α
[
πC
1− δ
− pb
F
2
]
+ (1− α)πM
)
.
Note that b’s profit is higher than a’s because pa < pb. Now consider
the no-investigation subgame. If firm a does not report, it makes profit
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πM + δπa((N,N), (RN,RN)). If it reports and chooses qD, its profit is
πD+δπC/(1−δ). Accordingly, (N,N) is an equilibrium of the no-investigation
subgame if
πa((N,N), (RN,RN)) ≥ πC/(1− δ) + (πD − πM)/δ. (7)
If (7) is not satisfied, at least one firm reports and picks qC .
Communication Stage and Deterrence To deter ((N,N), (N,N)) the
AA sets p ≥ pN,N(α). To deter ((N,N), (RN,RN)) the AA has to make sure
that (7) is not satisfied: then firms report in the no-investigation subgame
and this communication equilibrium does not exist. If p ≥ (2(πM − πD) +
2δ(1 − α)(πD − πC) − ρbδF )/(1 − ρb)δαF =: pRN,RN(α), (7) is not satisfied
and this communication equilibrium does not exist.
To sum up the marker case: The AA achieves complete deterrence if
p ≥ max{pN,N(α), pRN,RN(α)}. (8)
5.3 Optimal Deterrence
The optimal policy of the AA minimizes C(αp) subject to (8). Proposition
2 characterizes the solution (α∗, p∗).27
Proposition 2. There exists F > 0 such that:
a) if F < F , α∗ = (πM − δπC − (1− δ)(πD + F ))/δF and p∗ = 1;
b) if F ≥ F , α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and p∗ ∈ (0, 1) with α∗ defined by pN,N(α∗) =
pRN,RN(α
∗).
In Figure 4, the bold dashed line depicts the set of the optimal deterrence
combinations (α∗, p∗); for reasons of clarity we have not included the pN,N -
curve. Let us now compare the enforcement cost under the no-marker and
27Since the proof of Proposition 2 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we skip it.
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the marker system. If F < F so that p∗ = 1, the AA deters with the same
(α∗, p∗) combinations under both systems. Accordingly, the AA’s deterrence
costs are the same.
0
α
p
1
1
p̂
pR,N(α)
pR,R(α)
pRN,RN(α)
α
Figure 4: The deterrence region in the marker scenario
If F > F , p∗ = pRN,RN(α
∗) < 1. Furthermore, pR,R(α) < pRN,RN(α)
whenever the latter is less than 1. This means that for the cases b) i)
and ii) of Proposition 1 deterrence is more expensive in the marker than
in the no-marker scenario. In the no-marker scenario the AA deters the
((N,N), (R,R)) equilibrium where in the investigation subgame the proba-
bility of conviction is p2. In the marker scenario the AA deters the ((N,N),
(RN,RN)) equilibrium where in the investigation subgame the expected
probability of conviction is (pa + pb)/2 < p2. The expected payoff from col-
luding is thus higher in the marker than in the no-marker case and a higher
p is necessary to deter firms from communicating.
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This leaves us with the case b) iii) of Proposition 1. Here the outcome
depends on whether pRN,RN(α) and pR,N(α) intersect at some ᾱ > 0. If
they do not intersect, a marker is detrimental. Yet, if they intersect, for
α∗ > ᾱ, pRN,RN(α
∗) < pR,N(α
∗), and a marker is beneficial; see Figure
4. In the ((N,N), (R,N)) equilibrium, the probability of conviction is pa
in the investigation subgame. In the ((N,N), (RN,RN)) equilibrium, the
probability of conviction is (pa + pb)/2 > pa in the investigation subgame.
The expected payoff is thus higher in the no-marker case than in the marker
case and a higher p is necessary to deter firms from colluding.
To sum up: Deterrence is cheaper under the marker than the no-marker
system if and only if p̂ and F are sufficiently large. p̂ is large when firms
are sufficiently asymmetric, i.e., ρb  ρa. In the no-marker case only firm a
reports whereas in the marker case both firms report with equal probability.
Colluding is thus less attractive in the marker case and the AA has an easier
time to deter firms from communicating. In all other cases the marker system
does worse because the second-in-line firm withholds its evidence.
Finally, let us look at a minimum standard of evidence ρ̂ under the marker
system. If ρ̂ < ρa, the minimum standard has no bite and the preceding
analysis applies; ρ̂ > ρb corresponds to no leniency. If ρ̂ ∈ (ρa, ρb], firm b is
the only one to be able to obtain leniency; firm a cannot interfere. Firm b
does not need a marker to forestall being queue-jumped by firm a; therefore,
our analysis from Section 4 applies.
6 Conclusions
Nearly the entire literature on leniency looks at the case where all members of
a cartel have perfect evidence of the illegal conduct. This assumption implies
that if one member reports, no matter which one, the cartel is convicted for
sure. If all firms have perfect evidence, the distribution of evidence is sym-
metric and either all firms apply for leniency or no firm at all, a feature which
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is typically not observed in practice.28 Moreover, within such a framework
one cannot meaningfully analyze minimum-evidence standards and marker
systems, two typical features of actual leniency programs.
Our analysis highlights the importance of appropriate minimum stan-
dards of evidence. In a setting with high fines and asymmetric evidence,
deterrence is costly since the high-evidence firm has no incentive to report.
The AA can lower its enforcement cost by choosing a minimum standard
of evidence such that the high-evidence firm qualifies for leniency while the
low-evidence firm does not. Such a minimum standard restores the incentives
to report for the high-evidence firm. It can be sure to avoid the fine, because
the low-evidence firm is, in fact, excluded from leniency. The challenge for
the AA in practice is to get the minimum standard right. If the standard is
so low that both firms fulfill the conditions for leniency, it remains ineffective.
By contrast, a standard so high that no firm reaches the threshold renders
the whole leniency program ineffective.
When minimum evidence standards can be used, there is no need for
a marker system: The high-evidence firm is protected from being queue-
jumped anyway. If minimum evidence standards are not feasible, a marker
system has an impact. With a marker the AA gets only one report, with equal
probability the high- or the low-evidence one. This increases the deterrence
cost compared to the no-marker set-up if without the marker both firms
report; this is the case if the firms have similar evidence. If, however, without
the marker only the low-evidence firm turns in, the marker lowers the AA’s
deterrence cost; this happens if firms possess sufficiently different evidence.
Our model, therefore, suggests to use a marker system if and only if the
AA expects asymmetric distributions of the evidence in the possession of the
colluding firms.
We have not dealt with the arguments made in favor of a marker system
such as that this institution creates legal certainty and transparency or that
28See, e.g., Harrington (2013).
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the possibility to secure a marker with preliminary evidence may induce a
race to the courthouse. The analysis of these arguments to justify marker
systems is left for future research.
Appendix
Properties of pR,R and pR,N :
Using p2(p) = 1− (1− p)(1− ρa)(1− ρb), write (4) as
p ≥ 2(πM − πD) + 2δ(1− α)(πD − πC)− (ρa + ρb − ρaρb)δαF
(1− ρa)(1− ρb)δαF
=: pR,R(α). (A1)
pR,R(α) is continuous and decreasing in α. Rewriting (A1) yields
δαF [p(1− ρa)(1− ρb) + (ρa + ρb − ρaρb)] ≥
2(πM − πD) + 2δ(1− α)(πD − πC). (A2)
The LHS of (A2) equals 0 for α = 0 and increases in α. The RHS is positive for
α = 0 because πM/(1 − δ) ≥ πD + δπC/(1 − δ) and negative for α = 1. Hence,
(4) holds for values of α below some threshold and does not hold for values of α
above this threshold.
Using pa(p) = 1− (1− p)(1− ρa), write (5) as
p ≥ πM − πD + δ(1− α)(πD − πC)− ρaδαF
(1− ρa)δαF
=: pR,N (α). (A3)
pR,N (α) is continuous and decreases in α for pR,N (α) ≥ 0. Rewrite (A3) as
δαF [p(1− ρa) + ρa] ≥ πM − πD + δ(1− α)(πD − πC). (A4)
(A4) holds for values of α close to 1 and is violated for values of α small. Hence,
(5) holds for values of α below some threshold and does not hold for values of α
above this threshold.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Rewrite the AA’s minimization problem as (α∗, p∗) = arg minα,pC(αp)
s.t. p ≥ pN,N (α) or α ≥ αN,N (p), (A5)
p ≥ pR,R(α) or α ≥ αR,R(p), (A6)
p ≥ pR,N (α) or α ≥ αR,N (p), (A7)
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
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where
αN,N (p) :=
πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD
δpF
− 1− δ
δ
,
αR,R(p) :=
πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD
δ ([p(1− ρa)(1− ρb) + ρa + ρb − ρaρb]F/2 + πD − πC)
,
αR,N (p) :=
πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD
δ ([p(1− ρa) + ρa]F + πD − πC)
.
First note that p∗ ≥ pN,N (1) > 0 because pN,N is decreasing in α; α∗ ≥ αR,R(1) > 0
because αR,R is decreasing in p.
Second note that (A5) is always binding. Consider the relaxed problem of
minimizing the cost subject to (A6) and (A7). Then α = 1, p = ε > 0 and small
satisfy (A6) and (A7). The no-investigation subgame is never reached. In the
investigation subgame firms always report. They earn πC and pay the fine with
positive probability ε. They do better by not reporting in the first place. This
policy gives rise to the cost C(1ε) = εL/γ. Obviously, C(α∗p∗) ≤ εL/γ. Now
suppose (A5) is slack. Using α∗ ≥ αR,R(1) > 0 we have
α∗p∗ ≥ πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD
F ((1− δ)/α∗ + δ)
>
πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD
F ((1− δ)/αR,R(1) + δ)
> 0,
meaning α∗p∗ > εL/γ for ε sufficiently small, contradicting C(α∗p∗) ≤ εL/γ.
Third note that (α∗, p∗) = (α̂, 1) with α̂ = (πM − δπC − (1− δ)(πD + F )) /δF
if and only if (A6) and (A7) are not binding. Consider the Lagrangian of minimiz-
ing C subject to (A5). Solving the first-order conditions with respect to α and p
yields 1−δ = 0, a contradiction. Hence, either α∗ ∈ {0, 1} or p∗ ∈ {0, 1}. We know
already that α∗ > 0 and p∗ > 0. Consequently, either α∗ or p∗ equals 1. Suppose
α∗ = 1 and p∗ = (πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD)/F . Straightforward computations show
that decreasing α by dα and increasing p by dα(1− ε)p/α lowers the cost without
violating (A5). Therefore, p∗ = 1 and α∗ = α̂.
Fourth note that (α∗, p∗) = (α̂, 1), or equivalently (A6) and (A7) do not hold,
if and only if F ≤ F . Since αR,R(1) ≥ αR,N (1), (A6) and (A7) are not binding at
(1, α̂) if
2 (πM − δπC − (1− δ)πD) (πD−πC) ≥ (πM − πC + (1− δ)(πD − πC))F+(1−δ)F 2.
The LHS is positive. The RHS is 0 for F = 0 and strictly increasing in F . Thus,
there exists a unique F with the desired properties.
Fifth note that for F > F , α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and p∗ ∈ (0, 1). We know from the
previous step that for F > F either (A6) or (A7) is binding. Since αR,N (p) ∈ (0, 1)
and αR,R(p) ∈ (0, 1) for all p ∈ [0, 1], α∗ ∈ (0, 1). From our first step we know
30
that p∗ > 0. From our third step we know that in this case α∗ = α̂. In this case,
however, if p∗ = 1 step 4 implies F < F , a contradiction.
Sixth, straightforward computations show that αR,R(p) ≥ αR,N (p) or equiva-
lently pR,R(α) ≥ pR,N (α) if and only if p ≥ p̂ with p̂ defined in (1).
Seventh, if F > F and p̂ ≤ 0, p∗ = pN,N (α∗) = pR,R(α∗). From step 2 we know
that p∗ = pN,N (α∗) and steps 3 and 4 imply p∗ = max{pR,R(α∗), pR,N (α∗)}. By
step 6, p∗ = pR,R(α∗) if and only if p∗ ≥ p̂. Since p̂ ≤ 0 and p∗ > 0, this is always
true.
Eighth, If p̂ > 0, p∗ = pN,N (α∗) = pR,R(α∗) for F ∈ [F , F ] and p∗ =
pN,N (α∗) = pR,N (α∗) for F ≥ F . For F > F we have p∗ = pN,N (α∗) =
max{pR,R(α∗), pR,N (α∗)}. As can be easily shown, the three functions have unique
intersections. Therefore, p∗ is unique and, moreover, continuous and decreasing in
F . For F = F , p∗ = 1. If we increase F slightly, by continuity p∗ falls slightly.
Hence, p∗ > 1/2 ≥ p̂ and by step 6 pR,R > pR,N . For F sufficiently large, p∗ is
arbitrarily small, meaning p∗ < p̂. Consequently, pN,R > pR,R. 
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